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Democratic contingency and the digital age

Democratic contingency and the digital age

Democratic contingency and the digital age

We no longer adopt beliefs to facts; we live in a world where our beliefs are the basis for interpreting facts.

photo: Pixabay / Illustration

The old world is dying, and the new one is struggling to be born,
now is the time of monsters

(Antonio Gramsci)

Polarization, populism and post-truth, alongside business monopolies, algorithmic manipulations and deregulation, keep people in the vicious circle ultimately leading towards submission, malevolence, infantilization and anesthetization, eroding the core democratic processes. Anesthetized masses are required, as: “The strategy of those with power has long been based on the apathy of the masses. The more passive the masses, the stronger their power. But this logic is characteristic only in the bureaucratic and centralist phase of power”.

Simple and effective distraction techniques show a disgraceful contempt for citizens, derailing from urgent public interest matters for the satisfaction of private interests. Political narratives actually manufacture realities to fit their interests, and regard people as stupid to even believe in such manufactures. However, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer argued in his Theory of Stupidity: stupidity is not an intellectual defect, it is rather a surrender of our thinking abilities to slogans and lies, (these days) effectively accelerated and made available by online media and AI. Henceforth, humans don’t lack intelligence, the presented institutional and information architecture and social conformity and passivity cripple citizens’ ability to make a sound judgment on important topics. Contemporary world resembles Orwel's 1984 or Huxley's Brave New World, or some amalgamated version of these worlds, devastating empathy, sense of belonging and communities, isolating and inflaming people, appearing as though Overton window has fully shifted again.

Narrowing down to online media regulation and digital safety, which present growing challenges for democratic governance, bringing to the forefront abundance of harmful online content, disinformation, propaganda, hate speech, electoral interference, and lack of (means) of platform moderation, impacting the media ecosystem and democratic processes, coupled with the limited institutional capacity, extreme political polarization, and fragile media sustainability.

If honesty and introspection are applied, these notions must be regarded from the premise of human condition and its duality, and how well propaganda appeals to strong emotions, fear and anger campaigns work on humans. Addition to endorphin release by anger seems to be the latest drug trend, millions of compassionless and bitter individuals ripe for extremism, violence and brutalities. This fits nicely with complacency, entitlement and detachment of the well-offs, eager to preserve the status quo and their standing in societies. People do not only vote against their interests; they kick and scream for it, showing an increased level of resemblance to cult-like programmed artificialities, which leaves little doubt as to why political and lobby machines consider people stupid. The scams and lies work.

The desire to influence people’s beliefs and behavior with propaganda, lies, disinformation, hate speech, and other forms of manipulative and dangerous language is as old as human history. Opportunities to shape and influence people – from ancient Greek games to public assemblies and religious gatherings to AI and social media – have always been used to influence people's behaviors and actions. So, it is no surprise that bad actors, again and again, use new and emerging technologies in order to try and influence each phase of technological progress.

It should not be forgotten that “traditional media”, as we now call them, has been and still is complicit in political bias, promulgating hate, polarizing masses and extending societal raptures. The challenge they are facing is the means and acceleration of the rate, scope and impact of content designed to disrupt and undermine the structures of societies. Traditional media, to the greatest extent, entered a battle with the online world not by ethical standards and principles, but by ramping up the hate and division acceleration scale. Trying to get as many eyeballs for as long as possible, our media ecosystems – with an unprecedented speed and reach, algorithmic tools, AI and deepfake technology – are spreading, repeatedly and consistently, lies, confusion, doubt, blame, division, bulling and shaming, substantially amplifying interactive deception theaters, we are all (un)willingly part of.

We no longer adopt beliefs to facts; we live in a world where our beliefs are the basis for interpreting facts. Long gone are tactics that required substantial human and technical resources to roll out various deceptions, replaced by automated technology misused with near-zero cost. Business models include market dominance, with zero competition, economies of scale establishing market monopolies and entry barriers, acquisition of emerging competing services, capitalization on the personal data of users and “monetization” of market dominance by charging users and/or advertisers, leading to continued and enormous profits and growth. Overall, we seem to have replaced the famous “of the people by the people for the people” concept with “of corporations by crooks for corruption” paradigm.

Market monopolies and fraud

Current media environment and unregulated use of AI cannot be looked outside of the contemporary global economic trends, increasingly recognized as the golden age of fraud. There is even a higher level of honesty involved, corruption and greed at full display, followed by non-sensical “you should believe me and not your eyes or empty stomach” kind of an attitude. Fraud is not increased only in the form of individual cases, it is actually present on an industrial systemic scale, coming from all spheres of influence and power, burying deep into the ground claims of localized anomalies and rather exposing globalized “frauds as a service” pandemics.

AI is a heavy debt-based product, justified by its supposed unprecedented opportunities. One of the most visible issues with AI is the lack of transparency around it and around companies who build it. Whether AI is actually working towards the betterment of humanity, e.g., finding cures for diseases and finding reasonable and widely acceptable ways to combat climate emergencies, as we are constantly fed by its marketing campaigns, is unknown to the public. That same public whose lives depend on these discoveries and whose public resources are being deployed for unknown purposes, without tangible positive results. Abundance of evidence shows serious limitations to artificial intelligence, in addition to a wide-range of its negative impacts, like environmental and labor-related, coupled with consistent amplification of discriminatory, biased and hateful content, to name just a few. Also, the question is why, how and who decided to (prematurely) roll out this type of product to masses. AI does perform well in its basic function of predicting the next word, and is a quick search engine, for now. It is excellent in harvesting available human intelligence and linguistically recapping it for our use. When misused, people die, from Iran schools to a home in Orlando, Florida.

The question then is why such a hype. An overwhelmingly wide paradigm that AI is super-intelligent appears to be yet another scam (for now) by some excellent marketing, in the hands of a profiting few, affecting the rest of billions of humans. Judging by an overwhelming practice of getting informed of array of other products, the question is why the acceptance of a rather low-quality product features of AI persist. Moreover, the question is also why the regulatory regime in various different industries is not only readily accepted, but strongly requested, but in this area sold as regulatitis. If we are to take AI marketing seriously, if we take seriously the claims that we are not only at the precipice of generative, but superintelligence as well, it makes an even stronger case for regulation. Not that there are no loopholes and violations in the regulation of the other areas, but at least they are present as a norm, as a value system to work towards.

The AI development, at this stage, very much resembles the arms race, and we should all be terrified of it. If nothing else, just for this fact: Imagine your AI chat booth friend is an actual human. How long would you tolerate a know-it-all and know-it-best person, who experiences extended periods of delusionary behavior, and who, unless you paid them, forgets what you talked about the moment you left them?

When discussing the AI, but particularly in the “golden age of fraud”, we should recall David Runciman’s assertion that the current state of affairs is not unprecedented, as the past few centuries have been defined by the rise and dominance of two other “artificial intelligences”: the state and the corporation. Runciman argues that they offer a model for making sense of AI and they will be (hopefully), in the coming years, our best means of restraining it. He notes that the latest fashion is for voters to favor “charismatic” politicians, who claim to run the state in a manner which oversees the corporations or markets, where he sees it additionally exacerbated by the AI. It has already increased the ability of states, particularly the United States and China, to surveil their citizens, and the ability of corporations, such as Meta and Google, to supply states with data and to manipulate consumers for their own ends. Soon the AI may even undermine rather than augment the power of states and corporations, becoming self-directing, able to act on its own initiative and, still more ominously, capable of increasing its own ‘intelligence’. Because of this danger, Runciman calls for a double task, to restore the conditions for rational collective action in the political realm and to take responsibility to rehabilitate existing forms of political and economic decision-making before it is too late [1].

Shift in media regulation

Speaking of media regulation, it is good to recall that, historically, it revolved around technological issues (terrestrial radio frequency spectrum) and democratic concerns (the mass nature of the audiovisual media). These issues shaped the laws and the practices of the economic actors involved. Thus, in most democratic countries, at least in Europe, the audiovisual sector was initially deployed in a context of public monopoly justified by the fact that frequencies were a scarce public resource and by the fact, particularly in the aftermath of the Second World War and the ravages created by the propaganda machines [2].

It has been some time since the technological concern lost much of its justification. The scarcity of frequencies is almost no longer an issue for the television sector, with the development of satellite and cable and “over-the-top” networks. Broadcasting has gradually become democratized, diversified, privatized and also, thanks to satellite and then the internet, internationalized.

On the other hand, the democratic concern remains relevant, even more so, as: “the question of the basis of law and its modes of intervention is no longer part of a logic of scarcity, characteristic of audiovisual regulations during most of the twentieth century, but proceeds from a logic of risk reflecting the dynamics of regulation in the spaces constituted by the networks” [3]. Public policy issues are now migrating to the issues raised by a demand expressed by each user, asked to be able to decide what content to consume, when, and where on what type of device, which pose new challenges for public policies (the guarantee of pluralism and diversity, the protection of children, the framework for commercial communication, respect for human dignity, the fight against hate speech or discrimination, the promotion of national works, etc.).

Public media policies are trying to gradually adapt to these changes in technologies and uses, without losing their relevance, if the public interest objectives are to be guaranteed. It is precisely the ability of these policies to change the law and standards that allows them to maintain this relevance: “As soon as the media evolve, their regulation is transformed together, not by pure 'regulatory determinism', but in terms of what founds it with regard to the issues raised by the new techniques, the content they allow to convey and the modes of consumption that they entail. As there is no technicalist aim of communication, there can be no ‘regulatory’ conception of broadcasting policies that would seek to regulate for the sake of regulation. They too are, in a way, a function of the needs of society and the market” [4]. It is clear, however, that public policies that do not adapt to this new context quickly lose all relevance and legitimacy [5].

The contemporary EU related regulatory landscape emphasizes user empowerment and regulatory assessment of protective mechanisms’ obligations of online platforms and AI developers, with financial penalties, often seen as a drop in deep pockets of global digital platforms. Another “hope” is the judicial system, with various court cases against the platforms, usually resolving in financial settlements, which, again, take the drop out of the ocean of their financial resources. The relatively long legislative standstill in Europe in this area, from 1989 Transfrontier Directive, followed by a rather rapid adoption and adaptations of regulatory framework 2008, 2010 and current adoption and amendments of the Audiovisual Media Directive, coupled with increased institutional rearrangements, signals difficulties in catching up with technologic developments. It could also signal a lack of willingness or ability to properly and at global level respond to many challenges brought on by online media environments. Within this environment, media regulatory authorities are faced with numerous issues in attempting to remain relevant in such circumstances and attempt to effectively implement the legislative framework. Challenges include, but are not limited to the information asymmetry, the difficulty in accessing online media data and monitoring their activity, regulatory adaptability, resources required for necessary training and learning processes to challenges in the capacities and capabilities of the regulator, a need for even more cooperation between regulatory authorities etc.

From an internationalized media sector, we seem to be moving in the opposite direction, and it should be no surprise that we see the regionalized and localized efforts to build “their” social media and AI, effectively destroying the early promise of a genuine world wide web. It seems that calls for setting aside our mobile devices and instead looking for a genuine human connection is all in vain.

Reclaiming democratic contingency

The approach to regulation should not be thought of in isolation or in silos, but as an aspect of a broader policy devoted to the regulation of electronic communications networks and services, which is no longer limited to the influence of the mass media on the formation of opinions, but also concerns cultural and particularly democratic policies in the broad sense. The emphasis should be on the direct link between regulation to contemporary democratic malaise. When we know that democracy, as a concept, should be understood as a structured contingency [6], it becomes clear that the online media and AI are attacking the core requirement of open-ended contingency needed for democracy not to end. The regulation of online media and AI must be done with a fundamental function of restoring the very democratic contingency.

As Runciman argues, we need to assess whether the two other artificial notions, those of states and corporations, can tackle the golden age of fraud, erosion of human values, etc. If these artificial subjects continue to reinforce greed, corruption and authoritarianism, people should be able to rethink the basic premises of democratic governance and fine-tune it to democratically effective respond to these trends. In terms of electronic communications, the US’s proprietary and protective attitude from late 90’s towards the internet against the global, ITU-led regulatory initiatives should be reinforced by an acknowledgment and active shared governance of technologies that affect global population, markets and (supposedly) a sustained way of life. Open discussions are required, followed by the adoption of comprehensive and flexible guardrails and ethical standards for the deployment and use of AI and algorithms, ensuring they are used to enrich people’s lives rather than diminish the essence of humanity. Further, the Overton window needs to shift towards recognizing that greed and fraud have almost turned the Earth into a clinically terminal patient. Overall, we need comprehension and action based on the recognition that the extent of current challenges far exceeds problems connected to online media and AI, cited above, and are in fact ripping apart the very democratic fabric of our societies.

The question to ask is whether the regulation, as an extended hand of State, is adequate recourse to restoring democratic contingency. The creation of sectoral regulatory authorities by the legislators has, indeed, become a virtually global phenomenon (at least in liberalized economies), organizing an increasingly large number of sectors of social and economic activity. Regulation is set to be applied to the respect of public freedoms (human rights, integrity of electoral processes, access to information, protection of personal data, etc.) or to the supervision of an economic activity that is generally network-based. We seem to have forgotten that all these activities have in common that they are “sensitive areas, which must be protected both from the pressure of interest groups and from the grip of political power: State intervention is required to ensure control and regulation, but at the same time it is fraught with potential threats to individual freedoms; the establishment of an independent authority is a middle ground, which makes it possible to remove this contradiction and reconcile these two concerns” [7].

What is important to stress is that, if states do not push for effective responses to all these challenges, whether with effective regulation or otherwise, the current push towards Gramsci’s prediction is increasingly becoming a reality, an actual non-virtual reality. Once the bombs start, there is no option to doubt or opt-out of them. If the desire is to restore protection of public interest objectives, we can keep/change/reconstruct the established institutions, reinforce cross-border cooperation on equal footing, or choose another model. These efforts must be the result of human creativity, aided by AI, heavily underlined with anti-corruption and transparency requirements. This means a lot of work ahead. The kind which steps out of the known responsibilities and mandates. The kind which requires stepping out of the regulatory comfort zone, avoiding, at all costs, the regulatory capture and dreams of excellence. The kind which requires learning, trainings, research, cooperation, and collaboration, working together “to protect everybody’s collective interests, that is public interest values and not anybody’s singular interests”. The kind that helps us realize that we can and we have to take responsibility, each in our own homes, streets, neighborhoods and cities, each in our respective professions.

While AI brings challenges, it also offers unprecedented opportunities. It should up to humanity, not a selected few, to use this potential and capabilities responsibly, transparently and effectively. The fate of the impact of artificial intelligence on human life should rest exclusively in the hands of humans themselves, through elected officials who actually work for public good and in public interest, adopting legislative solutions which put independent regulation or another form of tenable protection mechanisms at the heart of challenges.

Whether humans lose or retain humanity will not depend upon unhuman intelligence, but the (lack of) human one. In any case, the outcome will be the ultimate test of the durability of all the messy, unpredictable, altruistic and terrific aspects of the human condition colliding with potentially extraordinary artificial power.

We need imagination. We need societal attitude change, combined legal, legislative and activist strategies, but, most of all, we need ethical vision of reconstitution of public life. Ultimately, we will either change and/or replace democracy to fit the information space or adapt the information space to fit democracy. Should there really be a choice here? Why not move to a global cross-border regulatory harmonization. As Jean Baudrillard argues, the logic of passivity of masses: “is characteristic only in the bureaucratic and centralist phase of power. And it is precisely this that today turns against the powerful: the inertia they have nurtured becomes a sign of their extinction”. Looking at history, strengthening democracy and public interest is not unprecedented, sadly usually following the full expansion of the Lucifer effect.

Perhaps history does not repeat itself, but it sure does rhyme. So why wait for horrific obliterating scenarios and human devastation and reach NOW for the wealth of experience in regulating various sectors, including media, build upon it with the help of AI and globally, responsibly and collectively restore old and build new necessary protections. Instead of continuing the path of redesigning democracy by manipulation, surveillance and massive concentration of private power, why not be honest and admit that we urgently need to change and adapt the institutional and regulatory framework. We need to govern the information environment so that it serves democratic processes, generate the best of human creativity, adopts responsibility, accountability and enforceable rights, and effectively governs the assistance of AI in an effort to maintain the democratic contingency as a tangible promise. In a nutshell, we need some serious deprogramming, before it is really too late.


[1] Runciman, David, The Handover: How We Gave Control of Our Lives to Corporations, States and Ais, Tantor Media Inc, 2023.

[2] Wagner-Hatfield: „Javne politike medija u demokratskim zemljama: komparativna analiza i preporuke prilagođene tuniskom kontekstu“, maj 2020.

[3] Trudel, P.: „La régulation de l'audiovisuel sur Internet: une logique de gestion de risque“, u P-F. Docquir, P-F. i Hanot, M. Nouveaux écrans, nouvelles régulation? , Brisel, Larcier, 2013, str. 210.

[4] Hanot, M., Païman, S. i Straetmans, V. „La compétence matériel à l'épreuve juridique de la réalité des modèles audiovisuels et des pratiques régulatoires“, u Auteurs&Médias, br. 6/2007, Les Nouvelles frontières de la radiodiffusion, str. 537.

[5] Wagner-Hatfield, isto.

[6] Przeworski A.: Democracy as a contingent outcome of conflicts. In: Elster J, Slagstad R, eds. Constitutionalism and Democracy. Studies in Rationality and Social Change. Cambridge University Press; 1988:59-80.

[7] Chevallier, Reflections on the institution of independent administrative authorities, Semaine juridique 3254, 1986.